

TOP SECRET

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Authority NW 32823

GHC 23 July 44
Authority of the
Chief Signal Officer

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of The Chief Signal Officer
APO 512A

IF-280

D8/4/11
GHC/eac
23 July 1944

SUBJECT: Interrogation Report

TO : The Chief Signal Officer, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Attn: Signal Security Agency.

1. Inclosed for your use is a copy of an interrogation report (A13/2/2) of three recent deserters from the 19th GAF Field Division. The report deals mainly with German radio and signal intelligence.

2. Reference paragraph 11 (c)i(c). The "two letter" code might be either a form of SLIDEX, which should never be used on W/T except in emergencies when no more secure means of encipherment is available, or a Fire Control Code.

3. Reference paragraph 11 (c)i(d). The system mentioned is apparently M-209 with the key indicator regularly used, since there is no mention of repetition of the initial double letter in the ninth and tenth positions. Such regular use is forbidden in this theater, since it immediately identifies stations as belonging to the same division and gravely compromises the code sign system. Instructions are that key indicators will be used only on messages that must be relayed beyond their normal nets, when there might be real difficulty in identifying the key used. In view of the statement in paragraph 11 (c)ii) that more attention was paid to call signs than to the body of the message, it seems probable that there is the explanation of the German interest in this type of traffic. There is of course the possibility that the standard of discipline in regard to proper encipherment of M-209 messages was sufficiently low to make the traffic itself readable. This office is confident that properly enciphered M-209 traffic will not prove profitable to the enemy.

4. It is requested that receipt be acknowledged by accomplishing and returning the inclosed form.

For the Chief Signal Officer:

R. E. Schukraft
R. E. SCHUKRAFT,
Lt. Colonel, Signal Corps.

1 Incl:
1 Copy - A13/2/2

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Note: Another report CSDIC/CMF/M 219 has been issued on these three PW on a wider distribution. It deals with HQ 19 GAF Fd Div, 19 GAF Sigs Bn, personalities, various GAF identifications and interrogation methods.

This report contains all information obtained from the PW on German intercept units and methods.

Name:	DOMAN, Wolfgang	PASTOR, Theodor
Rank:	L/Cpl	L/Cpl
Id No:	705 2/Fliieger Ausb Regt 61 OSCHATZ	2/Lw Nachr Abt 19 74
FP No:	00126 C (2 Coy 19 GAF sigs Bn)	00126 C
Deserted:	SUVERETO, 25 Jun 44	SUVERETO, 25 Jun 44
Secret No:	M44/716	M44/720
Interrogated:	CSDIC, CMF, 4 July 44	CSDIC, CMF, 4 Jul 44

Name:	ENGEL, Johannes
Rank:	Pte
Id No:	2/Lw Nachr Abt 19
FP No:	00126 C
Deserted:	SUVERETO, 25 Jun 44
Secret No:	M44/715
Interrogated:	CSDIC, CMF, 4 Jul 44

1. PREAMBLE(a) DOMAN

An intelligent 26 year old student of tropical agriculture from BAD LANDECK/GLATZ. Lived for many years in AMERICA. Speaks perfect English. Deserted owing to anti-Nazi convictions. Cooperative.

Function : R/T intercept operator Reliability : Very good

(b) PASTOR

A moderately intelligent 32 year old textile chemist from KREFELD. Also lived many years in AMERICA, where his mother is at the moment. Speaks good English. Cooperative but knowledge limited.

Function : R/T intercept operator Reliability : Good

(c) ENGEL

A 21 year old shop assistant from HAMBURG. Lived for many years in AMERICA. Speaks fair English. Cooperative but knowledge very limited.

Function : R/T intercept operator Reliability : Good

2. HISTORY AND MOVEMENTS

Note : Only the parts of the History and Movements of the PW which apply to their intercept work are reproduced in full in this report.

(a) DOMAN

Jan 40 Called up to 2 Coy 61 Air Tng Regt, OSCHATZ.
With various GAF units till

Apr 44 Attached to 19 GAF Fd Div Intercept Sec. Worked on the interception of British and American R/T stns in Britain.

May 44 Attached to Army Intercept Unit at LILLE.

Jun 44 Moved to ITALY; rejoined 19 GAF Fd Div at Suvereto.

25 Jun 44 Deserted.

(b) PASTOR

attached to 2 Coy 19 GAF Sigs Bn.
 course at THE HAGUE on R/T intercept work.
 returned to 19 GAF Sigs Bn. Worked in Div intercept sec.
 Jun 44 Moved with Div to Italy.
 25 June 44 Deserted.

(o) ENGEL

Aug 41 Called up to Labour Service in FRANCE.
 Mar 42 Posted to GAF Sigs Regt at Air Ministry, BERLIN. With GAF
 Units till
 16 May 43 Posted to 1 Coy 19 GAF Sigs Bn at VERNON/PARIS as teleprinter-
 operator.
 5 Jan 44 Sent on R/T intercept course at THE HAGUE.
 Feb 44 Returned to 19 GAF Sigs Bn at THIELT (BELGIUM). Posted to
 Intercept Sec 2 Coy and attached to Div HQ.
 Jun 44 Moved with 19 GAF Fd Div to ITALY.
 25 Jun 44 Deserted

3. INTRODUCTION

PWs' experience of intercept work is based on

- i) A three weeks' course at the Static Intercept Unit at THE HAGUE (VORBURG) in Jan 44. (PASTOR AND ENGEL).
- ii) A visit by on PW to the Intercept Unit of Army HQ at LILLE in May 44. (DOMAN)
- iii) Work with the Intercept Section of 19 GAF Fd Div in BELGIUM (THIELT, THOUROUT and CAPRYEKE) during the period Feb - May 44.
- iv) Work with the latter firm during a short period on the Italian front near SUVERETO in Jun 44.

Hence, although PW believe that the system of which they have experience is fairly general throughout the German Army, their actual first-hand knowledge is restricted to the methods obtaining in the firms mentioned above. Furthermore, as members of a low-level (divisional) sec PW were NOT allowed to be shown the workings of the system on its higher levels, and were themselves frequently working in the dark, obeying the orders of personnel on higher levels and handing over to them the results of their work, for interpretation and collation.

Both these factors should be borne in mind in assessing the value of PWs' statements, and both limited the amount of info that PW could supply. Within this framework, however, PW talked freely, and their statements can be considered reliable.

4. CHAIN OF COMMAND (LILLE area - beg Jun 44)

Each Div has its own short-range intercept sec (NACHRICHTEN NAHAUF - KLAERUNGSTRUPP) known as "N.N.A.T.")

The work of the various Div Intercept Secs is controlled by the Corps Collating Units (KORPS NACHRICHTEN AUSWERTESTAFFEL known as "KAST"). This unit may also have one or more independent NNATS under its command. 19 GAF Fd Div when in BELGIUM came under 89 Corps, whose KAST was situated at ANTWERP.

The KASTS are controlled by and send their work to the Army Collating Unit (HEERES AUSWERTESTAFFEL) where the main work of collation and interpretation is done. In addition to controlling the various KASTs within the Army, the Army Collating Unit has under its comd two Short-Range Intercept Coys and one Long-Range Intercept Coy. In May 44 one of these Army Collating Units was at LILLE.

The Army Collating Units are controlled by and send their work back to Army Group Intercept Unit 5 at PARIS (NACHRICHTEN AUFKLAERUNGS AUSWERTESTELLE 5 - NAAST 5). This latter orgn is in its turn controlled by the Intercept Dept at the War Office in BERLIN.

There are in addition certain static intercept units. One such is the Static Intercept Unit at THE HAGUE. PW are NOT clear under whose comd or at what level such units operate.

Outside the above chain of comd are the GAF Intercept Units. These are controlled in Western EUROPE by a GAF Intercept Organisation called "W-LEIT", with its HQ in PARIS.

The course at THE HAGUE lasted for a total of three weeks; it was attended by approx 50 students (40 W/T operators, 10 interpreters) all of whom were due to work at Div level. The course following that in which PW took part was for approx the same number of personnel from SS Divs.

12. MISCELLANEOUS (DOMAN)

In conversation with a soldier employed on wireless intercept at the W-LEIT in PARIS PW was told the following :

i) Radar

German Radar is stated now to be capable of detecting aeroplane engines on the ground in ENGLAND BEFORE THE Planes take off.

ii) Agents

The above soldier claimed knowledge of enemy agents in the AZORES with W/T transmitters who used to guide German A/C on patrol over the ATLANTIC. (Also of similar agents in LISBON, BARCELONA, AND TANGIERS).

E.H.M.C.

C.S.D.I.C.,
C.M.F.
8 July 44.

H.T. SHERGOLD, Major, I.O.
Army Section,
C.S.D.I.C., C.M.F.

Distribution,

According to PW, the GERMANS reckon that the PW interrogation is a source of info than is intercept.

Reception was in PW's experience (in BELGIUM) normally poor, but it rarely possible to distinguish all stations on any one net.

PW state that the 19 GAF Fd Div Intercept Sec was severely handicapped in its work by lack of Military Dictionaries, lists of abbreviations, and books about the Allied Armies, all of which were indispensable to the efficient performance of intelligence work.

(c) DF Stations (PEIL STELLEN)

PW knew of the existence of several of these. They are NOT quite clear how they are controlled administratively, but state that such stations work in close liaison with the various Corps and Army Intercept units.

PW believe that the KAST at 89 Corps (ANTWERP) controlled five DF stations with which it was in L/T contact. Should any of the Div Intercept Secs identify a new station they would inform Corps of the wave-length and call sign, and KAST would arrange to have the station DF-ed should it come on the air again.

At least three stations would normally take part in the fixing of an Allied set; the triangle of error produced by the three hearings obtained (working from BELGIUM to ENGLAND) would normally not be more than 1 km in width.

PW believe that a number of these DF stations work very closely with the Field Security Police in Western EUROPE in the tracking down of Allied agents. A case mentioned was at the beginning of May, when for one day a total wireless silence was ordered, apparently with success, several agents being in fact caught.

PW state that the normal Div Intercept Secs could function as DF stations with additional equipment (ZUSATZGERAET) fixed to their normal W/T receivers. In 19 GAF Fd Div however this had in fact never been done.

(f) L/T Intercept

PW state that the Intercept Secs at Div are to be equipped with an additional sec which is to operate as an L/T Intercept Sec (LAUSCHTRUPP). This is to be equipped with an intercept apparatus which PW describe as "hanging on the chest, with attached earphones". The theory was that the man, so equipped, should crawl out into no-mans land and listen in to enemy L/T conversations.

PW had no detailed knowledge of the performance of the apparatus, since none was in fact received.

(g) Recording of W/T and R/T intercepts

At the Static Unit at THE HAGUE there was a device for recording intercepts by means of a sound film.

PW could supply no reliable details.

(h) Tng of Army Intercept Units

Tng of W/T and R/T operators for the Intercept units at Army level and above is usually very thorough. All Army personnel at these units used to be trained at the Army Intercept School at MEISSEN; PW believe that this school has now moved to SAARBRUECKEN. The course lasts about three months. GAF intercept personnel are also believed to be trained there.

Personnel must be capable of intercepting both W/T and R/T, i.e. they must be able to understand both English and the morse code. The majority have normally qualified as interpreters at an Interpreters School.

Div Intercept Secs

Unlike intercept units at Army the tng of Div Intercept Secs is apparently very superficial. PW state that at the three week course for Div intercept personnel at THE HAGUE there were a few lectures on Allied W/T and R/T procedure (British and American orgn, armament and O of B etc), the remainder of the time was spent theoretically in watching the operators at work, in fact more often than not the students used to slip off down to the town and no-one ever seemed to object. It seems however clear from PW's description that for security reasons the students were not to be allowed to know more about the subject than was essential for the carrying on of their jobs at Div Intercept Secs.

that they did not receive much cooperation from the Div Staff. Neither the latter nor the G5(I) had any understanding of the principles of wireless interception and regarded the whole sec as a mixture of harmless lunatics and fatigue dodgers. Nevertheless PW state that the W/T operators were among the very best in the Div, having been specially selected for the work.

While in ITALY it was suggested that the Div Intercept Sec at 19 GAF Fd Div should be sent back to Army, to work as a part of one of the Intercept Coys at that it was in fact quite frequent for this to be done in mobile warfare under circumstances where any tactical info that the Sec might obtain would be too late to help the Div, and where comms with KAST were difficult.

(c) 19 GAF Fd Div Intercept Sec not in contact with the enemy (i.e. in BELGIUM Feb-May 44).

i) Type of message intercepted

PW's sec was told to concentrate on the following types of message:-

- (a) All R/T messages, whether in clear or "CODEX".
- (b) All W/T messages in clear.
- (c) All enciphered W/T messages in the "two letter" code (e.g. PG TR SD CV IU AS, etc.)
- (d) All enciphered W/T messages in 5-letter groups, where the first two letters of the first group were the same (e.g. ZZSDA QELKL TYUIQ) etc. (PW believe that in this code the first group is repeated at the end).
- (e) Any W/T messages combining words in clear with words in cipher.
- (f) Any messages containing the Q-code

All of these, they were told, could be quite easily deciphered.

PW were told NOT to intercept the following messages, on the grounds that it was impossible to decipher them:

- (a) Messages employing entirely numerals
- (b) The CONFAB TYPE OF MESSAGE.

ii) Call Signs

A special effort was made to discover Allied call signs; less importance was normally attached to the body of the message.

It was realised that the call signs would change every day, but nevertheless every effort was made to obtain and record as many of them as possible.

iii) Flying OPs

Orders were also issued to listen in to Flying OPs whenever possible; PW believes that this would have been done extensively had the Div actually used intercept when in action.

(d) Success achieved

PW believed that there was very much less success achieved at present in intercept than had been the case two years ago. He stated that this decline had started with what is known as the "SCHWARZER TAG" (Black Day) in AFRICA when the BRITISH captured a complete GERMAN intercept unit; the resultant revision of sigs technique had made Allied sigs systems very much more secure.

PW were uncertain as to exact details of the achievements of high-level intercept. During their work in BELGIUM the only single major success of which they are aware is the identifying in Apr 44 of the AMERICAN 6 Airborne Div in ENGLAND. This was the first identification of this fm and up till then GERMAN Intelligence had NOT been aware of its presence in ENGLAND. Apparently the identification was achieved owing to insecurity on the part of a W/T operator; a message was being sent in cipher, there was some sort of a mis-understanding, and the operator sent in clear. "This is HQ 6 American Airborne Div".

PW state that the DIEPPE raid was foretold several days in advance owing

Authority NW 32823INTERCEPT UNIT 5 (PARIS) (NACHRICHTEN AUFKLAERUNGS AUSWERTESTELLE 5)
DEPARTMENT, WAR OFFICE ("OKH"), BERLIN

PW knew very little of these, only that they formed the further links in the chain of comd, i.e. all important intercepts being sent from Army at LILLE to PARIS, and thence to BERLIN.

Messages too difficult to be deciphered at Army were sent to Army Group at PARIS. PW thought that this was the first place where the attempt was made to break high grade cipher.

PW state that stations monitoring USA are located at BERLIN and MUNICH.

9. GAF INTERCEPT ORGANISATION (W-LEIT) PARIS

This organisation controlled all GAF intercept work throughout Western EUROPE. It was directly under the Air Fleet SPERLE. It ran its own courses, and after passing the more advanced courses students would be promoted to the status of officer.

The organisation is believed to possess a large number very efficient mobile DF stations, the whole DF apparatus mounted in a specially built van.

10. STATIC INTERCEPT UNIT, THE HAGUE (Jan 44)

(a) General

PW believe that this unit was termed a Long-Range Intercept Unit (NACHRICHTEN FRENAUFKLAERUNGSTAFFEL). It was situated in VORBURG, a suburb of THE HAGUE. By Jan 44 it had already been in the same place for three years, the personnel seldom changed, some had even married local girls, bought houses and begun construction, proof against anything but a direct hit from a hy bomb.

(b) Organisation and Strength

The unit consisted so far as PW knew, of 16 wireless receivers and an estimated staff of approx 100.

For working purposes the unit was orgaised into an HQ and Collating Sec, and four Intercept Secs, each with tree sets intercepting W/T and one set intercepting R/T; the work of the secs was distributed as follows :

- 1 Sec 1,000 - 3,000 Kcs
- 2 Sec 3,000 - 4,000Kcs
- 3 Sec 4,000 - 8,000 Kcs
- 4 Sec 8,000 - 12,000 Kcs

During the day all sets were manned: at night. 50 per cent.

(c) Equipment

R/T operators were equipped with ULRICH sets and the W/T operators with T-Type sets (for details see para 5.b).

(d) Trng : Courses

This unit used to run courses for the personnel of Div Intercept Secs (see para 11.h. below).

11. INTERCEPT METHODS

(a) General Principles

1) Div in contact with the enemy

When the Div was in contact with the enemy the duty of the Intercept Sec was to listen-in to the R/T and W/T transmissions of the enemy fmps opposing their div, to glean what immediate tactical infom they could in regard to enemy strengths, intentions, locations and movts, and to pass it direct to the GSI ("Ic") of the Div. The theory was that they would normally be expected to monitor the inf...

work both R/T and W/T would be monitored. The interpreters would transcriptions in ENGLISH on a special form provided, they would then fill in the German translation in the space at the foot of the form; and send the whole form to GSI of the Div if the message seemed of importance or likely to be of tactical interest. Should the message not contain any matter likely to be of immediate interest to the Div, then it would be sent back to the KAST in the normal way.

The W/T transmissions would be taken down by the W/T operators, and handed over to the interpreters. If the transmission was in clear the interpreters would translate it into GERMAN, and follow the procedure outlined above, i.e. if it appeared to be of tactical interest send it direct to Div GSI, otherwise send it straight back to KAST. If, on the other hand, the transmission was in cipher, it would be sent straight back to KAST, there being no attempt made at Div level to decipher it.

The frequencies on which they should listen would be allotted to the Div Intercept Sec by the KAST. Normally two or more enemy nets would be allotted, since it was unlikely that any one station would be on the air continuously, the stn to be monitored would depend on the tactical situation.

The appreciation was that during a battle the fwd enemy transmitters (at bn, coy and sqn level) would normally be too busy to use anything but clear; no arrangement therefore seems to have existed at Div level for the transcribing of "CODEX" messages.

PW state that the principle was laid down that the intercept sec should be as far fwd as possible, even to within two kms of the front. PW thought it unlikely that this would be carried out in practice owing to

- i) The difficulty of liaising with Div GSI.
- ii) The vulnerability of the Sec to arty fire.

ii) Div NOT in contact with the enemy

Under these circumstances the Div Intercept Sec would come more directly under control of the KAST, to whom all messages would be sent, whether intercepted in clear or in cipher, e.g. when 19 GAF Fd Div was in BELGIUM its Intercept Sec, while remaining at Div HQ, worked almost entirely under the orders of 89 Corps at ANTWERP.

Each set would be given a range of frequencies to monitor, e.g. 2,000 - 3,000 Kcs. A list of the known enemy stations located in this waveband would be supplied. The Intercept Sec would normally listen-in and record any of these (sometimes a list of priorities would be given, but if none of these was broadcasting the operator would simply turn the tuning dial until he came onto a station which was transmitting, he would then monitor this station). Occasionally KAST would ring up and order the Div Intercept Sec to monitor a definite frequency; this would normally be some new station which had just come on the air, probably at the start of some manoeuvre in ENGLAND.

Daily reports of all intercepts were sent by the Div Intercept Sec to Corps by DR. The Div Sec had its own L/T comm with KAST through the Div exchange, and used code words to pass infm. These code words were changed frequently.

The same procedure would be followed for translation as when the Div was in action, i.e. R/T messages taken down by an interpreter on a special form in ENGLISH AND the GERMAN translation done at the bottom of the form; W/T messages in clear taken down by the W/T operator (who know no ENGLISH), translated at the foot of the form by the interpreter; W/T messages in cipher taken down by the W/T operator and sent back to KAST undeciphered. There was a special form for each type of message.

The Div Intercept Secs were NOT expected to identify the units to whom they listened at any time; such identifications always came from the KAST, and PW believe that in fact KAST got these from Army.

(b) 19 GAF Fd Div Intercept Sec in contact with the enemy

PW emphasise that the principles listed in para 10.a.i. were, as far as they were concerned, only theoretical; they had no experience of them working in practice. In ITALY, during the short time they had been there the Div Intercept system had altogether failed to work. As will be seen, the Div Intercept Sec is completely dependent for its successful working on the guidance of the KAST at Corps, without whose assistance it cannot even determine the frequencies being used by the fms and mits opposite it. On arrival in ITALY and on coming to the front, no-one at HQ 19 GAF Fd Div seemed to know, in the confusion of the retreat, where the KAST

5. DIV INTERCEPT SECS (NNAT)(a) Organization and Strength

Secs form part of the W/T Coy of the Div Sigs Bn, but are in practice always under operational comd of GSI ("Io") at Div HQ, and under technical direction of the KAST (Corps Collating Unit).

At 19 GAF Fd Div the Intercept Sec consisted of 10 men i.e.

- 1 Sigs Sjt
- 4 W/T Operators (monitoring morse transmissions)
- 4 English-speaking interpreters (monitoring speech transmissions)
- 1 Dvr

Immediately before the move to ITALY an Interpreter Sjt was attached to the Sec, but PW believe that he was extra to the establishment.

PW believe that every div in the German Army is now equipped with one of these secs.

(b) Equipment

PW's Intercept Sec was equipped with one W/T van, containing one "ULRICH" receiver with special large tuning dial for listening-in to R/T, and two T-Type sets for listening-in to W/T. The ULRICH sets had a theoretical range of 700-20,000 Kcs and a practical range of 1,000-12,000 kcs; the T-type sets had a range of 1,000-12,000 Kcs. The van was fitted up so that it could be used as an office for the work of recording and translation.

The R/T set was to be manned continuously throughout the 24 hrs. One W/T set was manned continuously, the other only during the day.

6. CORPS COLLATING UNITS (KAST)

PW had only a very limited knowledge of the working of these.

KASTs were responsible for the coordination and collating of all infm from the Div Intercept Secs in the Corps. These latter would send all W/T and R/T messages to the KAST; here the messages would be sifted, and the important ones sent to Army.

KAST would also be responsible for the allotting of either frequencies or wave-bands to the Div secs; so far as PW knew, the basic work for this would be done at Army, the KAST simply passing on the wave-lengths in which it or the Div were interested.

PW believe that in addition to the NNATS working as Div Intercept Secs, the KAST might have one or more independent NNATS of exactly the same establishment working directly under its own comd, but so far as they know this was NOT the case with 89 Corps.

The KAST itself was a comparatively small affair, about 5-6 men.

PW believe that Corps had at least five DF stations u/c.

7. Army Intercept Units

The Army Intercept Unit at LILLE consisted so far as PW knew of a Collating Office (HEERES AUSWERTESTAFFEL) and three Intercept Coys, i.e.

- Two Short-Range Intercept Coys (NACHRICHTEN NAHAUFKLAERUNGSKOMPANIE)
- One Long-Range Intercept Coy (NACHRICHTEN FERNAUFKLAERUNGSKOMPANIE)

Personnel in the Intercept Coys at Army level were all trained language-speaking signallers, i.e. capable of covering both R/T and W/T.

The Coys would all be fully employed while the Army was in action, but during rest periods, e.g. while the Army was at LILLE, the two Short-Range Recce Coys were detached for duty elsewhere, the Long-Range Coy alone remaining.

PW believed that the Coys were equipped with approx 16 intercept sets